NOTES
DEEP SEABED MINING: ALTERNATIVE
SCHEMES FOR PROTECTING DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES FROM ADVERSE IMPACTS
INTRODUCTION

The fast approaching reality of deep seabed mining has been
a source of great concern for developing countries. Ambassador
Pardo first made the world aware of these concerns in 1967 with
his now famous speech before the United Nations General Assembly
in which he suggested that the resources of the seabed should be
declared the common heritage of mankind.' The first step in protecting developing countries was taken with the General Assembly
Moratorium Resolution prohibiting unilateral seabed mining pending the establishment of an international regime.' Most recently,
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III) has been the forum for discussion of alternative
measures to protect the concerns of developing countries.'
At UNCLOS III, negotiations entailed three specific developing
country concerns. The first stems from the concept that the
resources of the seabed are the common heritage of mankind.
Developing countries want to insure a share in the revenues from
the exploitation of seabed resources. The second concern is ancillary to the first. In order to be able to share in these revenues,
22 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/6695 (1967). See also Statement of Ambassador Pardo before
the First Committee, 22 U.N. GAOR, Agenda Item No. 92, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1515-1516
(1967). For a discussion of the concept of common heritage as applied to seabed resources
see Gorove, The Concept of "Common Heritage of Mankind": A Political, Moral, or Legal
Innovation?, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 390 (1972).
2 Moratorium Resolution, G.A. Res. 2574D, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30 at 11, U.N. Doc.
A/7630 (1969). The vote on the resolution was far from unanimous. The United States voted
against it challenging its binding effect as international law. See Murphy, The Politics of
Manganese Nodules: International Considerationsand Domestic Legislation, 16 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 531, 539-47 (1979). For references concerning the legal status of seabed mining, see
infra note 17.
1 United Nations Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text), U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/L78 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Draft Convention]. The provisions concerning
seabed mining are contained in Part XI of the Draft Convention. See also Knight, The Draft
United Nations Conventions on the InternationalSeabed Area: Background, Description, and
Some Preliminary Thoughts, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 459, 477-88 (1971) (history of the early
development of the seabed question); Synopsis, Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea,
1977-1978, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 705 (1979) (discussion of the development of the mining regime
in the Law of the Sea).
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the developing countries want the technology for exploitation made
available to an international authority which will participate in seabed mining. The third concern is the fear of adverse economic effects to be suffered by developing countries that are land producers
of the minerals to be taken from the seabed. The scope of this
paper is limited to the third of these three concerns.
Solutions to these three problems were apparently devised at
UNCLOS III, but certain recent developments are likely to renew
them. The first was the passage of unilateral legislation by the
United States4 and the Federal Republic of Germany 5 providing
for interim regulation of seabed mining activities. Developing countries are concerned that their interests will not be protected adequately if seabed mining begins under this unilateral legislation.
The second development was the withdrawal of the United States
delegation from negotiations at UNCLOS III in March, 1981. The
delegation was recalled by the Reagan Administration to re-evaluate the United States position.6 Apparently the Administration's
position is inconsistent with the concerns of developing countries
that seabed mining will affect their economies adversely, because
the Administration opposes any limitations on production 7 Production limitations were provided as one means of protecting these
particular developing countries.8
Given these recent developments, three situations for seabed
mining are possible. First, mining may begin after the passage of
a comprehensive Law of the Sea Treaty, with developing countries
protected by the schemes previously devised. Second, a comprehensive Law of the Sea Treaty may not be completed and mining may
begin subject to regulation only by unilateral legislation. Or third,
a comprehensive Law of the Sea Treaty may be completed but
developing countries would not be protected adequately because
either some of the countries that will carry on seabed mining activities would not agree to the treaty, or the protection schemes
were substantially diluted or completely excluded.9
In the context of these three situations, this note re-evaluates
the concern of developing countries with land based production
Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1979, 30 U.S.C. SS 1401-1473 (1980).
Act of Interim Regulation of Seabed Mining of August 26, 1980, 119801 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB] 1 9080 (W. Ger.), reprinted in 19 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1330 (1980).
Washington Post, March 4, 1981, at Al, col. 3.
Statement by the President, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 94 (Jan. 29, 1982) thereinafter
cited as Statement by the President].
' See infra text accompanying notes 76-78.
' See Gamble, Where Trends the Law of the Sea? 10 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 61 (1981).
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that their economies will be adversely affected by seabed mining.
The first part examines the potential impact of seabed mining on
the markets of the minerals to be mined, and the consequent impacts on the developing country producers of these minerals. The
second part considers protections provided these countries in the
Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Draft Convention).0 The
third part analyzes the viability of using the schemes in the Integrated Programme for Commodities (IPC) as alternative sources
of protection for these developing countries.
I.

THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF DEEP SEABED MINING ON
MINERAL MARKETS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

A.

Physical Aspects of Deep Seabed Mining

Deep seabed mining is a capital intensive industry, and therefore,
has only been pursued by consortia composed of mining companies
from several countries." In 1979, six consortia were involved in
various phrases of seabed mining.2 For the most part, activities
were restricted to the research and exploration stage, and although
tests of several methods of mining have been conducted, 3 commercial production is not expected to begin until at least the 1990's.' 4
Because even exploration and testing require the expenditure of
large amounts of capital, members of the industry want to insure
the security of their investments.' 5 The major factors that will affect the commencement of commercial production are:
1)
2)

The potential profitability of seabed mining;
The legal status of seabed mining; and

Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 136, at 50.
* Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act: Hearings and Markup on H.R. 2759 Before
the Subcommittees on InternationalEconomic Policy and Trade and on InternationalOrganizations of the Committee on ForeignAffairs, 96th Cong. 39 (1979-80) (statement of Marne Dubs)
[hereinafter cited as 1979 House Hearings].
0

12U.S. DEPT OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF MINES, MINERALS YEARBOOK, 1978-79, AREA REPORTS:

INTERNATIONAL at 40-41 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MINERALS YEARBOOK]. The six consortia

are: (1) Ocean Mining Associates; (2) OMCO (Ocean Minerals Company) Consortium; (3) DOMA
(Deep Ocean Mining Associates) (Japanese); (4) AFERNOD (French Group); (5) CLB Group;
(6) Kennecott Copper Corp.
13 Id.

4 OCEAN ASSOCIATION OF JAPAN, THE DEEP SEABED AND ITS MINERAL RESOURCES, PRO-

CEEDINGS OF THE 3RD INTERNATIONAL OCEAN SYMPOSIUM, Nov. 15-17, 1978, at 81 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL OCEAN SYMPOSIUM].

See generally Murphy, Deep Ocean Mining: Beginning of a New Era, 8 CASE W. RES.
U. J. INT'L L. 46, 50-51 (1976). Members of the industry are concerned that they will invest
large amounts of capital in developing mining sites only to find that they will have to
share their site or the profits from the mining of the site with an international authority.
S
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The availability of adequate financing."6

The availability of financing probably will depend to a great extent on the first two factors. Until a comprehensive treaty on the
Law of the Sea is completed, the legal status of seabed mining
will remain uncertain. 7 The potential profitability of seabed mining is dependent on many factors, including the world market for
the relevant minerals and the existence or non-existence of artificial
controls on those markets.
The minerals that are currently the most promising for exploitation are found on the seabed in the form of nodules shaped like
large potatoes."8 These nodules contain many minerals, but nickel,
copper, manganese, and cobalt are, at present and for the future,
the most economically feasible for exploitation. 9 The nodules can
be divided into four basic types on the basis of the concentration
of these four minerals in the nodules. The most attractive contain
greater than lo each of nickel and copper.' According to one rough
estimate, approximately 150/0 of the world's seabed is covered by
"0Economic implications of Sea-Bed Mineral Development in the International Area: Report
of the Secretary General, Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 62/25 (1974) at 8 [hereinafter cited as Economic Implications: Report of the
Secretary General].
" Companies are concerned with the legal status because of their desire to know their
rights against companies attempting to exploit areas they have prospected. 1979 House
Hearings, supra note 11, at 12 (statement of Elliott Richardson). For a discussion of the
legal aspects of seabed mining, see Letter dated April 23, 1979 from the Group of Legal
Experts on the Question of Unilateral Legislation Addressed to the Chairman of the Group
of 77, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/77 (1979); Biggs, Deepseas Adventures: Grotius Revisited, 9 INT'L
LAW. 271 (1975); Burton, Freedom of the Seas: InternationalLaw Applicable to Deep Seabed
Mining Claims, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1135 (1977); Goldie, CustomaryInternationalLaw and Deep
Seabed Mining, 6 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 173 (1979); Saffo, The Common Heritage of
Mankind: Has the General Assembly Created a Law to Govern Seabed Mining?, 53 TUL. L.
REV. 492 (1979); Note, Murky Waters:Private Claims to Deep Ocean Seabed Minerals,7 L. &
POL'Y INT'L BuS. 1237 (1975). See also Murphy, supra note 15 (discussing the legal status of

seabed mining and early U.S. and Group of 77 proposals for regulation).
10Ocean minerals exist in other forms also. Phosphorous exists in clumps; iron ore, sulphur,
copper, zinc and berite ore are mined from deposits on the ocean floor; and several minerals
are dissolved in the ocean itself. See OCEAN YEARBOOK 1, at 182-208. (E. Borgese and N.
Ginsberg eds. 1978). More recently deposits of polymetallic sulfides are being considered
for exploitation. These deposits consist largely of zinc, iron, sulfur, silver and copper in
high concentrations. Murphy, Polymetallic Sulfides, SOUNDINGS, LAW OF THE SEA NEWS AND
COMMENT,

Nov. 1981-Feb. 1982, at 1.

11Collins, Mineral Exploration of the Seabed; Problems and Alternatives, 12
RESOURCES LAW. 599, 605 (1978).

NAT.

21 D. LEIPZIGER & J. MUDGE, SEABED MINERAL RESOURCES AND THE ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF

126 (1976). The other three categories are: (1)Nodules with high iron
content and less than one percent each of nickel, copper, and cobalt; (2) nodules with high
manganese content and very little nickel, copper, and cobalt; (3) nodules with high cobalt
content and small amounts of nickel and copper.
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
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these nodules.2 The greatest potential for mining is in prime areas
where higher grade nodules are more concentrated.' Most of these
prime areas are located in the Pacific Ocean. 2 The total recoverable
amount of minerals is still too speculative to estimate with any
precision, but one authority has estimated that the Pacific Ocean
alone contains 1.66 trillion tons of nodules.24
B.

The Impact of Deep Seabed Mining on Mineral Markets and
Developing Countries

The impact exploitation of these nodules may have on developing countries has long been recognized as a legitimate problem.
The economies of most developing countries depend heavily on earnings from the exports of raw materials including minerals. In 1974,
a report was submitted to the General Assembly of the United
Nations which purported to show the potential economic impact
of seabed mining on the world markets for the relevant minerals.25
The report recognized that if the market of a particular mineral
was significantly affected, any developing country whose economy
was dependent on that mineral for export earnings could also be
affected. The report examined both the potential short and long
term effects of deep seabed mining on the markets of the four
minerals most likely to be concerned: nickel, copper, manganese,
and cobalt. However, in order for the report to reach any conclusions, assumptions had to be made regarding the future levels of
several important factors in the economic equation.
One assumption made concerned the tonnage of nodules that
would be recovered in a single year. The United Nations report
estimated that fifteen million tons of nodules per year could be
mined by 1985.26 This figure is directly related to the number and
size of mining operations capable of commercial production. Optimal sizes for economic efficiency have been estimated to be two
to three mining rigs per operation, each rig with a production capacity of one to two million dry tons of nodules per year." The
amounts of the few key minerals produced would depend on their
relative concentrations within the nodules. Assuming 15 million tons
21 INTERNATIONAL OCEAN SYMPosIuM,

supra note 14, at 55.

' Id. at 57.
23 Id.
24 D. LEIPZIGER & J. MUDGE,

supra note 20, at 124 (citing J.

MERO, THE MINERAL RESOURCES

175 (1965)).
Economic implications: Report of the Secretary General, supra note 16, at 7.
Id. at 29.

OF THE SEA

7

Id.
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of nodules per year are produced, the estimated metal production
per million tons of nodules is 230,000 tons of manganese, 15,000
tons of nickel, 13,000 tons of copper, and 2,000 tons of cobalt."
The United Nations study also assumes that commercial recovery
of seabed minerals will begin by 1985. However, mining companies
have been hesitant to commit large amounts of capital to development due to the depressed state of world mineral markets as of late
and the uncertainty surrounding the legal position of seabed mining.' If mining does not commence until several years after the
predicted 1985 date," the world demand for the relevant minerals
probably will have risen past the projected 1985 levels. If so, the
impact of seabed mining may be significantly less than predicted.
Seabed production conceivably could begin at the same level as predicted for 1985, 15 million tons of nodules, but the world demand
would be greater; thus seabed nodules would be available to satisfy
a smaller share of the world demand.
The impact seabed mining will have on the markets of the four
minerals, and concomitantly the economies of the developing countries that produce those minerals, will depend in general on the
relationship between supply and demand in those markets. The
fear of the developing countries is that seabed mining will decrease
either their capacity to export the minerals or their export earnings by causing the prices of the minerals to drop.
Determining the extent of any impact at some point in the future
involves a consideration of many speculative factors. Both future
demand and future supply have to be predicted. The United Nations study determines future demand by taking the demand for
"5The nodules most attractive for exploitation contain greater than 1% each of nickel
and copper. The average assays of these nodules according to Leipziger and Mudge are
330/0 manganese, 1.5/o nickel, 1.1% copper, and 0.4% cobalt. D. LEIPZIGER & J. MUDGE,
supra note 20, at 126. The U.N. study assumes average assays of 24% manganese, 1.6%/
nickel, 1.4% copper and 0.21% cobalt. The average metallurgical recovery rate is assumed
to be 95%. Using these figures the study calculates the approximate metal production.
Economic implications: Report of the Secretary General, supra note 16, at 28. If the Leipziger and Mudge assays were used, the approximate metal production would change only
slightly as is shown below.
L&M
U.N.
(tons)
Mn
316,250
230,000
Ni
14,062
15,000
Cu
10,214
13,000
Co
3,809
2,000
Deep Seabed Hard Minerals: Hearings on S. 493 Before the Committee on ForeignRelations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 83 (1979) (statement of Elliott Richardson) [hereinafter cited
as 1979 Senate Hearings].
' See supra text accompanying note 14.
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the latest year for which data is available and applying an estimated
annual growth rate for that demand until the year for which the projected demand is desired. If the growth rate of demand changes, the
projected demand will change. If demand grows faster than predicted, the impact of seabed mining on the developing countries
at any particular point in the future is likely to be lessened. Conversely, if demand grows slower than expected, the impact is likely
to be greater. In the long term analysis, the availability of substitutes, the potential for recycling, the industrialization of developing
countries, and the development of new technology, all could affect
the future demand of any of the four minerals.
The future supply of these minerals could depend to a large
degree on the magnitude of seabed production, which in turn is
limited by cost and technology. Both the cost of seabed mining
and the rate of development of the necessary technology are
speculative factors. Predicting future supply also requires a consideration of the level of land based production and a determination
of the level of seabed production. The rate of depletion of land
based reserves and the discovery of new reserves will affect future
supplies, as will the development of new production technology.
In addition to future supply and demand, other factors may contribute to the determination of the extent to which seabed mining
will effect the developing countries. The level of dependence on
a particular mineral exhibited by a country will determine the
degree of impact that a change in either supply or demand will
have on the country's export earnings. If the country is largely
dependent on the mineral, the impact on export earnings will be
greater than if the level of dependence is lower. However, the level
of dependence for most countries is likely to decrease as they
become more industrialized and are able to export manufactured
products. Another factor which may lessen the impact of seabed
mining is the existence of trade agreements which guarantee a
certain export level to the developing country. If a country has
a guaranteed export level, it can be injured only if the prices of
the minerals drop.
Despite the difficulty in making accurate determinations of the
future levels of supply and demand of the minerals, the United
Nations report makes some reasonable predictions of the impacts
of deep seabed mining on the mineral markets. Translating these
potential impacts into effects on the economies of developing countries is a problem of economics, but some general conclusions can
be made by studying the projected effects on the following four
mineral supply markets.
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1. Manganese
The United Nations study prediction for the manganese market
in 1985 is that seabed production will depress prices.3 The primary
use of manganese is in steel production,32 and it has no suitable
substitutes." Any increase in supplies would decrease the price. 4
Assuming a 5% growth rate for demand, the 1985 estimated world
demand is 16.4 million metric tons (mmt).35 The estimated production of manganese from the seabed in 1985 is 920,000 tons, which
is 5.6% of the projected world demand. 6 Estimates indicate that
world reserves of manganese (excluding seabed resources) should be
more than adequate to meet demand through the year 2000. 37
Therefore, seabed production has the potential for displacement
of some demand for land based production, but the effect should
not be significant considering the relatively small percentage of
projected world demand seabed production could meet. However,
at least one authority believes that the industrialized world's demand for manganese will equal and begin to exceed land based
supplies by 1985, resulting in significant shortages by the year
2000. 3 In this case, developing countries probably would be harmed
very little by seabed production, as their reserves are expected
to be depleted significantly by that time. 9 The countries most likely
to be affected are the Republic of South Africa, Gabon, and Brazil.
They were the largest developing country producers of manganese
in 1978.0
2.

Nickel

The conclusion of the United Nations report with respect to the
Economic Implications: Report of the Secretary General, supra note 16, at 9.
32 Id. at 37.

U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF MINES,
13 (July, 1979) [hereinafter cited as MINERAL

MINERAL COMMODITY PROFILES: MANGANESE
COMMODITY PROFILES: MANGANESE].

, Economic Implications: Report of the Secretary General, supra note 16, at 38.
SId.
230,000 tons of manganese/million tons of dry nodules times 4 million tons of nodules
920,000 tons of manganese. When this report was prepared only two mining companies
were interested in the recovery of manganese, therefore, 4 million tons of nodules is used
in the computation rather than 15 million tons. However, if all companies were interested,
the estimated production would be 3.45 million tons of manganese, or 21% of the projected
world demand. Id. See supra text accompanying note 27.
" MINERAL COMMODITY PROFILES: MANGANESE, supra note 33, at 17. This projection is based
on a growth rate of demand of only 2.9% and a projected demand of 12.6 mint. Even at
a 5% growth rate, however, land reserves should be more than sufficient to meet demand
in 1985.
' 1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 29, at 244.
"' Id. at 165.
40 MINERAL COMMODITY PROFILES: MANGANESE, supra note 33, at 3.
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possible impacts of seabed mining on the market for nickel is that
land based producers will not be affected seriously.4 Developing
countries accounted for only 13/o of total world production in 1972,2
and this figure was projected to increase to only 170/o by 1985. 43
The only major developing country producers of nickel are New
Caledonia, Indonesia, and the Dominican Republic, which accounted
for approximately 12%, 5.4%, and 3.2%, respectively, of the total
world production in 1979. 44 Therefore, these countries should be
affected only minimally by any impacts on the world market. The
Dominican Republic may feel the effects most if its dependency
on nickel exports does not decrease. 5 Land based reserves of nickel
are expected to be sufficient to meet the projected world demand
in the year 2000,46 but the United Nations study predicts that land
based production would have to increase by 70/o over 1972 levels
in order to meet the 1985 demand. 47 Therefore, seabed production
may be necessary to help compensate for any deficiency if land
based production lags.
3. Copper
Seabed production is not expected to have a significant impact
on the world copper market as a whole because of the relatively
small amount of seabed production expected in relation to world
land based production. Seabed production of copper will probably
represent only from 1.3% to 2.0/o49 of world demand in 1985,
depending on the growth rate of demand. The developing countries most likely to be harmed are Chile, Zambia, and Peru. In
1978, copper accounted for over 900/0 of Zambia's exports,' 52/o
" Economic Implications: Report of the Secretary General, supra note 16, at 34.
42

Id.

" Id. at 35.
" These percentages were obtained by dividing each country's production by the total

world production.

MINERALS YEARBOOK,

supra note 12, at 25.

"3 In 1978, exports of nickel represented 10.6% of the Dominican Republic's total exports. Id. at 1124.
" U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF MINES, MINERAL COMMODITY PROFILES: NICKEL 15, 18
(May 1979) [hereinafter cited MINERAL COMMODITY PROFILES: NICKEL]. The demand for nickel

has been predicted to grow anywhere from 3.6% per year, Id. at 15, to 50% per year.
Economic Implications: Report of the Secretary General, supra note 16, at 34.
'3 Economic Implications: Report of the Secretary General, supra note 16, at 34.
,3 Id. at 36. The United Nations study estimates that copper production from the seabed
would only be about 0.2 mmt or 1.3% of the 24.9 mmt of expected demand by 1985. The
expected demand of 24.9 mmt is based on a 5% growth rate for demand.
19 U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF MINES, MINERAL COMMODITY PROFILES: COPPER
MINERAL COMMODITY PROFILES: COPPER]. This estimate

(Sept. 1979) [hereinafter cited as

16
is

based on a growth rate for demand of 3.8%/ and a projected 1985 demand of 20.2 mint.
s' MINERALS YEARBOOK, supra note 12, at 1068 (in 1978 the value of total exports was $818.4
million and the value of copper exports was $760.3 million).
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of Chile's,5 and 42% of Peru's.2 Due to the level of dependence
on copper for export earnings, any impact on the world market
could have a significant effect on these economies. Traditionally,
Chile has depended on copper for 70-80% of its export earnings,
but dependence has been decreasing recently due to an export diversification program.0 Seabed production may displace some land
based production before the year 2 00 0 ,1 but demand beyond then
is expected to exceed present reserves.5
4.

Cobalt

The market for cobalt probably would experience the most extensive impact from seabed production. The total estimated world
demand for 1985 is only 60,000 metric tons. Seabed production
in 1985 is expected to be 30,000 metric tons, or 50% of the estimated
world demand. 7 A 50% increase in production could translate into
a 66% drop in price as supply is relatively inelastic with respect
to price. 9
The unusual nature of the cobalt market makes the potential
impact even more difficult to predict. Cobalt is mined as a byproduct .of nickel and copper.' Therefore, cobalt production will
be limited by the level of nickel and copper production. 1 The two
countries likely to be affected most are Zambia and Zaire. Cobalt
accounts for as much as one third of the export earnings of each."
Zaire is the world's largest producer of cobalt, accounting for approximately 40% of total production in 1979, and probably would
experience a significant decrease in export earnings.63 New Caledonia is the only other developing country that is a significant
producer." World supply is more than adequate to meet demand

5
5'
5'

Id. at 21.
Id. at 727.
Id. at 221.
MINERAL COMMODITY PROFILES: COPPER, supra note 49, at 2.

Id. at 18.
Economic Implications: Report of the Secretary General, supra note 16, at 41.
5'Id.

5' Id.

at 9.
U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF MINES, MINERAL COMMODITY PROFILES: COBALT 1 (Oct.
1979) [hereinafter cited as MINERAL COMMODITY PROFILES: COBALT].
6* MINERAL COMMODITY PROFILES: COBALT, supra note 59, at 1.
5'

Id.

U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF MINES, MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES 1980, at 2,
(1980) (hereinafter cited as MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES].
" Id. at 39.
" New Caledonia provided 13% of the total world mine output in 1978. Id. at 5.
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through the year 2000.' However, production might not keep pace
with demand because of limited nickel and copper production,
surges in demand, or political or military interruptions."
While the number of developing countries likely to be affected
by seabed mining seems relatively small, some of those that are
affected may suffer a serious impact. Although it is speculative,
a determination can be made with some accuracy and agreement
as to who will be affected and to what extent. The level of impact

that is to be considered significant may be the subject of future
controversy, but could be determined under the chosen protection
scheme.

II.

THE PROTECTION SCHEMES OF UNCLOS III

Despite the conflicting interests of the more than one hundred
developing countries participating in UNCLOS III, they have
managed to attain some cohesiveness and form a formidable bloc
in the negotiations. The motivation for their solidarity stems from
many sources, but the result is support by the whole for the interests of a few. 7 Therefore, even though few developing countries are likely to be affected by seabed mining, their demand for
protection is likely to be supported by the entire bloc of developing countries."
Article 151 of the Draft Convention provides three protection
schemes for land based producers: commodity agreements, seabed
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
' For a discussion of this issue, see Friedman and Williams, The Group of 77 at the United
Nations: An Emergent Force in the Law of the Sea, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555 (1979) (discussion of the unity of developing countries on the Law of the Sea).
The participation of developing countries at the Law of the Sea has been the subject
of numerous articles. See generally Adede, The Group of 77 and the Establishment of the
InternationalSeabed Authority, 7 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 31 (1979) (the group of 77's interest
& the Authority); Barkenbus, Seabed Negotiations: The Failureof United States Policy, 14
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 623 (1977) (how developing countries have affected the U.S. position on
seabed mining); Borgese, The New InternationalEconomic Order and the Law of the Sea,
14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 584 (1977) (the relationship between the NIEO and the Law of the Sea);
Ferreira, The Role of African States in the Development of the Law of the Sea at the Third
U.N. Conference, 7 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 89 (1979); Friedman & Williams, The Group of 77
at the United Nations: An Emergent Force in the Law of the Sea, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555
(1979); Juda, UNCLOS III and the New International Economic Order, 7 OCEAN DEV. & INTL
L. 221 (1979); Manley, Developing Nation Imperativesfor a New Law of the Sea: UNCLOS
I and III as Stages in the InternationalPolicy Process, 7 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 9 (1979) (the
evolution of developing country interests in the Law of the Sea); Pohl, Latin America's
Influence and Role in the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, 7 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L
L. 65 (1979).
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production limitations, and compensation. 9 The stated purpose of
these schemes is to "promote the growth, efficiency and stability
of markets"70 for the seabed minerals. The International Seabed
Authority (Authority) is the organ established to promote these
policies and control activities in the seabed.71
A.

Commodity Agreements

Article 151 of the Draft Convention gives the Authority the
power to participate in international commodity agreements concerning minerals produced from the seabed. 7 Commodity agreements provide long term protection for land based producers by
stabilizing prices and assuring market access. 3 No specific provisions for the negotiation of these agreements are provided in the
Draft Convention, but several writers have suggested that the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development would be
a proper forum.7' Because commodity agreements may take years
to negotiate and implement, the Draft Convention contains provisions for more immediate protection in the form of production
limitations and compensation.
B.

Production Limitations

The purpose of production limitations is to prevent seabed production from displacing land based production."5 This is accomplished by limiting the production of nickel from the seabed to 600/a
of the increase in nickel consumption.7 6 The production of copper,
manganese, and cobalt necessarily are limited thereby because their
relative concentrations to nickel in the manganese nodules is fairly
consistent.7 7 The production limitations are only temporary, however. They are to last twenty-five years, or until the end of a review
69

Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 151, at 56-58.

" Id. art. 151(1), at 56.
" Id. arts. 156-158, at 61.
7

Id. art. 151(1), at 56.

71International

commodity agreements will be discussed in detail in Section 111.
",See Vicufia, The Regime for the Exploitation of the Seabed Mineral Resources and the
Quest for a New InternationalEconomic Order of the Oceans: A Latin-American View, 10
LAw. AM. 774,780 (1978). See generally Juda, UNCLOS III and the New InternationalEconomic
Order,7 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 221, 237-43 (1979). This issue is the subject of section III, infra.
71 But cf. Borgese, A Constitution for the Ocean: Comments and Suggestions Regarding
Part XI of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 371, at 389 (1978)
(production controls are meaningless and too complicated to work efficiently).
"' Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 151(2(b), at 57.
" See supra note 18. For a criticism of this ancillary limitation, see D. LEIPZIGER & J.
MUDGE, supra note 20, at 219-20.
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conference to be held fifteen years after commercial production
begins, or until commodity agreements can be established.78
C.

Compensation

The final scheme for protection contemplated by the Draft Convention is compensation. Article 151(4) provides that a compensation system should be set up to provide assistance to developing
countries that experience adverse effects on their economies as
a direct result of seabed mining. 9 No specific compensation scheme
is elaborated, but provisions are made for cooperation with existing
agencies and organizations." While compensation may provide the
most immediate relief, it may be the most ineffective and inefficient
form of protection in the long run.
The question of the adequacy of the three protection schemes
discussed above cannot be answered until the specific details of
the schemes are completed. However, the acceptance by the developing countries of these schemes seems to indicate their satisfaction
that they will be protected adequately by the Draft Convention. The
possibility exists, however, that an agreement will not be reached
on the Draft Convention, or at least that some of the provisions
of Article 151 may be changed. The United States has indicated
its dissatisfaction recently with the concept of production controls, 1
and may try to renegotiate those provisions." The solidarity of
the developing countries should make it difficult for the United
States to gain any concessions on this point without making significant concessions in other areas. However, if the developing country
bloc can be split on this issue, the fact that only a few developing
countries are likely to be affected by seabed mining may give the
United States enough negotiating advantage to reduce or eliminate the production controls. Other possibilities are that agreement
on the Draft Convention will not be reached before seabed production begins, or that the United States and other industrialized countries with the technological capacity to mine the seabed will not
be parties to the treaty. In any of the above three situations, developing countries with land based production may have to look beyond
the Law of the Sea negotiations for protection.
,' Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 151(2)(a), at 56.
Id. art. 151(4), at 58.
Id. Compensation is discussed in detail in Section III, infra.
, Statement by the President, supra note 7.
',Katz, Refloating the Law of the Sea Treaty, Christian Sci. Monitor, Feb. 1, 1982, at
23, col. 3.
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INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS AND THE
INTEGRATED PROGRAMME FOR COMMODITIES.

The Integrated Programme for Commodities

International commodity agreements may be the best source of
protection for those developing countries whose economic well-being
is threatened by seabed mineral production. The Draft Convention recognizes commodity agreements as a source of protection,
but does not elaborate on the form they should take.' International
commodity agreements presently exist for several commodities,
but not for any of the four seabed minerals." The possibility of
negotiating agreements for these four minerals has been facilitated
somewhat by the adoption on May 30, 1976, of the Integrated Programme for Commodites (IPC) by the Fourth Session of the United
85
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD IV).

The IPC is designed to be "a program of global action to improve
market structures in international trade in commodities of interest
to developing countries, and which is consistent with the interests
of all countries, particularly those of developing countries ... "I'
The IPC, with its detailed structure for commodity agreements,
would be an excellent forum for negotiating the commodity agreements contemplated by Article 151 of the Draft Convention or for
negotiating commodity agreements as an independent and alternative source of protection.
B.

Objectives of the Integrated Programme for Commodities

If international commodity agreements negotiated within the
bounds of the IPC are to provide protection for those developing
countries that may be affected adversely by seabed mining, they
should have objectives which are consistent with the needs of those
countries. The major concern of developing country producers is
that seabed mineral production will have adverse effects on their
export earnings.87 These earnings are a function of market price
Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 151(1), at 56.
See, e.g., International Coffee Agreement, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1976, T.I.A.S.
No. 8277 [hereinafter cited as 1976 International Coffee Agreement]; Fifth International
Tin Agreement done June 21, 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8607 [hereinafter cited as Fifth International Tin Agreement]; International Cocoa Agreement, opened for signature Nov. 10, 1975,
U.N. Doc. TD/Cocoa .4/8 (1975).
Res. 93 IV, Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
1 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Fourth Session (Agenda Item 8) 6 U.N.
Doc. TD/218 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Res. 93 (IV)].
'

Id. at 7.

'7

In addition to the desire to protect their export earnings, these countries may also

1982]

DEEP SEABED MINING

and export capacity. Both of these factors could be affected by
seabed mining. Market prices could be depressed if supplies are
increased by seabed production. Export capacity could be decreased
if seabed production displaces part of the demand for developing
country production. These concerns are not peculiar to developing countries likely to be affected adversely by seabed mining, but
have been recognized as general concerns of all developing countries the economies of which are substantially dependent on earnings from the export of commodities. 8
The declared objectives of the IPC are: (1) to stabilize prices;
(2) to improve the real income of developing countries through protection of export earnings; (3) to improve market access and the
reliability of supply; (4) to diversify production in developing countries; and (5) to improve the market structure for commodities. 9
Those objectives are consistent not only with the needs of the developing country producers, but go beyond to the improvement of
the economic position of developing country producers of primary
products.'
C.

Protection Schemes of International Commodity Agreements

The objectives of the IPC are to be achieved through the implementation of several international measures, which include:
1) The establishment of a common fund for the purpose of enacting international stocking arrangements;
2) The establishment of supply management measures such as
production controls and export quotas;
3) The improvement of compensatory financing facilities; and
4) The expansion and
diversification of export trade including
91
industrialization.
1. Buffer Stocks
Buffer stocks can help stabilize prices and export capacity by
regulating the quantity of a mineral valuable to the world market
at any particular time. The international commodity agreements
be interested in actually increasing their export earnings. This would increase their economic
strength relative to developed countries pursuant to the goals of the New International
Economic Order.
" Avramovic, Common Fund: Why and of What Kind?, 12 J. WORLD TRADE L. 375, 376
(1978).
" Res. 93 IV, supra note 85, S I at 7.
" See supra note 87.
" Res. 93 IV, supra note 85, S III at 7, 8.
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for both tin' and cocoa' utilize buffer stocks as a control mechanism.
In order to operate the system, a target price range is determined.
As prices rise toward the upper limit of the price range, stocks
of the commodity are sold in order to expand the supply and reduce
the price. As prices drop toward the price floor, stocks are bought,
supply is restricted, and prices rise." The buffer stocks are maintained through a fund established by the commodity agreement.
Financing for the stocks under the 1975 International Cocoa Agreement is obtained through the imposition of a levy on all imports
and exports of cocoa. 5 The fund for the Fifth International Tin
Agreement is established by contributions from parties to the
agreement."
The establishment and continuation of international buffer stocks
is central to the IPC17 The arrangements for buffer stocks under
the IPC are similar to the arrangements in the Tin and Cocoa
Agreements. One innovative feature of the IPC scheme is a proposal to adopt the concept of indexation." Indexation is an attempt
to protect developing countries from the effects of inflation by adjusting the total price ranges within the buffer stock quota to account for the effects of inflation on the prices of manufactured goods
imported by developing countries."
One of the major obstacles to the establishment of international
stocking arrangements has been the inability to obtain sufficient
funds to maintain the stocks.10° This problem has been reduced
greatly by the adoption of the Agreement Establishing the Common Fund for Commodities (Common Fund) in Geneva on June 29,
1980.2" The Common Fund has two accounts. The first provides

Fifth International Tin Agreement, supra note 84.
International Cocoa Agreement, supra note 84.
Note, United States and InternationalCommodity Accords: Cocoa, Coffee, Tin, Sugar
and Grain, 9 L. & POLY INT'L Bus. 553, 556-57, 583, 585-86 (1977) [hereinafter cited as International Commodity Accords]. Both agreements also incorporate export quotas to be used
in conjunction with the buffer stocks. Export quotas are discussed in Section III, infra.
'5 Id. at 557.
Id. at 584.
'7 Action on Commodities, including Decisions on an Integrated Programme, in Light
of the Need for Change in the World Market Economy, Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat,
UNCTAD IV, U.N. Doc. TD/184 (1976) thereinafter cited as Report by the UNCTAD
Secretariat].
"8Id. para. 38, at 13.
" Id. para. 59, at 19.
Id. para. 21, at 9.
Agreement Establishing the Common Fund for Commodities, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, TD/IPC/CF/CONF/24 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Common Fund].
"
'
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financing for international buffer stocks, and the second provides
financing for other measures in the field of commodities.'012 Loans
are made under the first account to international commodity organizations for the purpose of financing the purchase and maintenance of buffer stocks held pursuant to international commodity
agreements.0
2.

Export Quotas and Production Controls

A surplus supply of a commodity on the market can cause the
price of the commodity to drop. Export quotas are designed to
keep surpluses off the market and thereby keep prices stable. 104
The 1978 International Coffee Agreement" 5 uses export quotas to
keep coffee prices within a certain price range."° If quotas are used
as the sole control mechanism, the export earnings of producer
countries will not necessarily be protected, Prices will remain
stable, but export capacity is reduced. The Tin and Cocoa Agreements use export quotas in conjunction with buffer stocks. Export
quotas are increased or decreased depending on the direction prices
are moving. 107
The production controls provided for in Article 151 of the Draft
Convention can help limit excess supply of the seabed minerals
on the market without affecting the export capacity of developing
country producers. The major difference between these production controls and export quotas is the time frame in which they
operate. Changes in production controls would take a much longer
time to affect the market because of the time lapse between production decisions and actual production. Export quotas, on the other
hand, can have a more refined effect on the market because they
can be imposed on a yearly basis.
3.

Compensatory Financing

Compensatory financing arrangements can provide more direct
and immediate protection to injured developing countries than
market controls. The IPC contemplates the compensation arrangements in international commodity agreements will supplement the
Id. art. 3, at 4.
"

10
"

Id. art. 17, at 17.
Gariepy, InternationalCommodity Agreements, 25 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 677, 680 (1976).
1976 International Coffee Agreement, supra note 84.
InternationalCommodity Accords, supra note 94, at 575.
Id. at 557, 583.
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schemes for price stabilization through market control.' °5 Compensation may be necessary to protect individual countries that are
adversely affected, even though the world market is stable. 0 9 Article 151 of the Draft Convention provides for the establishment
of a compensation scheme, but does not elaborate on the details
of such a scheme."' Compensatory financing under the IPC could
be provided through the existing facilities of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) or through the adoption of a scheme similar
to STABEX in the Second Convention between the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) States and the European Economic Community (EEC) signed in Lome on October 31, 1979 (Lome II)."'
If the IMF facility is used, a few major improvements should
be made." 2 First, determinations of shortfalls for purposes of compensation would have to be made on the basis of the larger of either
total commodity exports of the country or all merchandise exports. 3 The second improvement relates to the issue of indexation. Shortfalls should be determined in terms of real export earnings."' This could be achieved through the establishment of an indexed reference price. Any shortfall caused by a fall in market
price below the indexed price would be compensated." 5 The third
problem is that the IMF only provides short- and medium-term
financing in the form of loans. Grants and longer-term loans would
be more beneficial to the poorer developing countries.' Finally,
a country's present balance of payments situation should not be
a consideration in providing compensation for injuries resulting
from export fluctuations."'
STABEX is a good example of a functional compensation
scheme." 8 STABEX establishes a system of grants and loans for
ACP states that experience temporary losses of export earnings.
In order for a country to receive payments, it must demonstrate
that it has surpassed a dependent threshold" 9 and a loss threshold."
108Report
109 Id.
10

by the UNCTAD Secretariat, supra note 97, para. 42, at 7.

Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 151(4) at 58.

The Second ACP-EEC Convention, Oct. 31, 1979, reprintedin Lome' II Dossier, reprinted
from The Courier, Nov. 1979 (Special Edition) [hereinafter cited as Lome II].
Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, s'upra note 97, para. 43, at 15.
Id. para. 44, at 15.
"

114

Id.

Id. para. 61, at 19.
e Id. para. 44, at 15.

"5

11l

Id.

Lome II, supra note 111, at Title II.
...Id. art. 29.
11 Id. art. 37.
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If a country's export earnings from one of the seabed minerals
drop below the reference level and level off, compensation will be
provided only until the reference level drops to the new export
level. If the export earnings continue to drop, eventually they will
fall below the threshold level and become non-compensable. Compensation is provided primarily in the form of loans to be repaid
without interest, 121 but repayment may be waived altogether by
the EEC.'" STABEX could be a model for a new compensation
scheme suitable to the needs of the IPC.
4.

The Expansion and Diversificationof Export Trade Including
Industrialization

In the long-run, export diversification and industrialization are
the best ways for developing countries to protect themselves from
the possibility of economic injury from seabed mining. The root
of the problem for developing countries is their dependence on
primary commodities for export earnings. By increasing industrialization, the countries can process the commodities and export them
as manufactured goods, thereby removing them from competition
with seabed minerals. If the countries can diversify their exports,
their economies will not be so dependent on the key seabed minerals
and the potential injury will be lessened. The second account of
the Common Fund may provide financial assistance in this area.
Financing is provided in the form of loans or grants to international
commodity bodies, 2 ' which are to consist of the consumers and
producers of the particular commodity who represent a sufficient
share of its exports and imports. 24 No specific programs are mentioned, but particular measures aimed at improving market conditions and competitiveness of the commodities are enumerated. 25
The basic thrust of these measures appears to be toward increasing industrialization of the developing countries that depend on
the protection of primary commodities and the expansion and diversification of the export trade of these countries.
The IPC, when fully implemented, could provide adequate protection for developing countries that suffer harm from seabed mining. However, in its present form the IPC has one very serious
drawback: although other commodities may be added, at present
. Id. art. 40, para. 4
Id. art. 44.
'=
Common Fund, supra note 101, art. 18C, para. (c).
12 Id. schedule c.
"
Id. art. 28c, para. (a).
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it covers only eighteen commodities and only two of the seabed
minerals, copper and manganese.2 6 However, the UNCTAD Secretariat suggests that a compensation scheme could be established
to cover commodities not included in commodity agreements.2 7
CONCLUSION

The concerns expressed by developing countries at UNCLOS
III over the possible adverse economic effects of seabed mining
are likely to surface again in light of the recent interruptions in
negotiations at UNCLOS III and the enactment of unilateral legislation for seabed mining by the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. Determining which countries will be affected by
seabed mining, and the extent of those effects, is a speculative
venture at best. However, a generalized conclusion seems to be
that of the four minerals to be mined from the seabed, copper,
nickel, manganese, and cobalt, the market for cobalt is likely to
be affected most seriously. Furthermore, although only a few
developing countries are likely to be adversely affected, those that
are could be affected seriously. While seabed production may be
harmful to developing countries in the short run, it may be
necessary in the long run to bridge the gap between land based
production and world demand for the minerals.
Developing country producers will need protection whether seabed mining begins subject to a comprehensive Law of the Sea Treaty, subject to a Law of the Sea Treaty to which the major seabed
mineral producing countries are not party, or subject only to unilateral legislation. The most promising source or protection is the
IPC, and the recent agreement on the Common Fund is a major step
toward its implementation. The IPC can provide short-term protection in the form of buffer stocks, export quotas, and compensatory
financing, as well as long-term protection through industrialization and export diversification. When the IPC is fully implemented,
developing countries and the rest of the world can look forward
to the benefits to be reaped from the exploitation of deep seabed
minerals.
David Hegwood

Res. 93(IV), supra note 85, S 11 at 7.
Report by the UNTAD Secretariat, supra note 97, para. 64, at 20.

